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searched prior to the arrest is not a de
minimis intrusion that may be ignored.
[d. at 1098. The Court held that incident
to the arrest, an officer, without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, could
search places immediately adjoining the
area of arrest from which an attack could
be launched. [d. Beyond that, however,
"there must be articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from these facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing
that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger... " [d.
In so holding, the Court emphasized
the limited scope of a protective sweep;
that is, it should be confined to a cursory
visual inspection, not a full search, of
areas where a person may be found. It
may last as long as is necessary to relieve
the suspicion of danger but no longer
than is necessary for the arrest and departure. [d. at 1099.
Moreover, the Court maintained that
its holding did not conflict with Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Buie,
110 S. Ct. at 1099. The Chimel Court held
that a warrantless but justifiable search
incident to an in-home arrest was limited
to the arrestee's person and the area from
which he could obtain a weapon. The
Court distinguished Chimel in two ways:
1) it was concerned with preventing a
full blown search of a house for evidence
unrelated to the arrest, unlike the more
limited intrusion of a protective sweep;
and 2) the justification for the search was
the threat posed by the arrestee, not by
unseen third parties. [d.
Relying on Terry and Long, the Supreme Court held that warrantless protective sweeps of private dwellings
during an arrest are to be measured by a
reasonable articulable suspicion standard. By relaxing the general rule requiring probable cause, abuse of police
discretion in determining the necessity
and scope of a protective sweep may
result. However, the Court has yet to
recognize the validity of such speculative
concerns.
-Tena Touzos

the Supreme Court stated that "where
the City's compelling interest in the
the privacy interests implicated by the
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the
search are minimal, and where an imporpublic. [d. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683. Thus,
tant governmental interest furthered by
the court of appeals reversed the trial
the intrusion would be placed in jeopcourt's ruling.
ardy by a requirement of individualized
In September of 1986, the City of Ansuspicion, a search may be reasonable
napolis proposed to the unions a drug
despite the absence of such suspicion."
testing plan, which required police and
fire fighters, as part of their regularly[d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676 (quoting Skinscheduled periodic physical examinaner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417).
tions, to submit urine samples to ascerIn applying the Supreme Court holdtain the presence of illegal drugs. Id. at
ings of Skinner and Von Raab to United
Food, the court of appeals focused on the
546, 565 A.2d at 672-73. One year later,
degree of intrusiveness of the "actual"
after the parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the details of the proassaying of the urine sample for drug use,
gram, the City flied a complaint of unfair
instead of the mandatory taking of the
sample. [d. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. The
labor practices with the State Mediation
court reasoned that the employees had
and Conciliation Service. [d. The City
alleged in its complaint that the unions
already been providing samples for analfailed to negotiate in good faith. [d. The
ysis as part of their regularly-scheduled
physical examinations. [d. Recognizing
State Mediation and Conciliation Service
that the actual assaying of samples for
found that the drug testing program was
not unconstitutional as an unreasonable
drug use constituted a search, the court
search and seizure and allowed the City
in United Food found that the instrusion
to implement its program. The unions,
on employees' reasonable expectation of
privacy was not only "minimal" under
seeking to prevent implementation of
the program, appealed to the Circuit
Skinner and Von Raab, but negligible
for four reasons. Id.
Court for Anne Arundel County. Id. at
54748, 565 A.2d at 673-74. The circuit
First, the employees in United Food
court found that the plan was unconstireceived three distinct notices of testing:
(1) that the physical would be during
tutional under the fourth amendment,
because it was not based on individualtheir "birthday" month; (2) within thirty
ized suspicion of drug use among the
days, they knew the week of the examiemployees. [d. at 549, 565 A.2d at 674.
nation; and (3) within forty-eight hours,
The lower court then issued a writ of
they knew the time ofthe physical. [d. at
mandamus enjoining the city from imple554, 565 A.2d at 67&77. Second, the
disclosure of "private facts," including
menting its program. [d. at 550, 565 A.2d
at 675. The City appealed the circuit
evidence of physical infirmities or latent
court's decision, and the Court of Apdiseases, was already part of the regular
peals of Maryland granted certiorari prior
physical examination. [d. at 554-55, 565
to consideration by the court of special
A.2d at 677. Therefore, no reasonable
appeals. [d.
expectation of privacy existed with regard to the disclosure of private facts. [d.
In reaching its decision, the court of
appeals relied primarily on two recent
Third, employees were required to comSupreme Court cases that were decided
plete a medication form to determine
whether a positive test could have reafter the lower court's ruling. In the first
sulted from an employee's lawful use of
case, National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384
drugs. [d. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677 (em(1989), the Court upheld mandatory susphasis added). Although certain private
picionless drug testing of Customs Servmedical facts might be disclosed on the
ice
employees
involved
in
medication form, the same facts would
drug
City ofAnnapolis v. United Food &
interdiction or who carried a firearm.
be the subject of inquiry during a routine
Commercial Worker~ Local 400:
physical examination. [d. Thus, compleUnited Food, 317 Md. at 551, 565 A.2d
DRUG TFSTING OF CITY POIlCE
tion of the medication form was not a
at 675. In the second case, Skinner v.
AND FIRE FIGIITERS WAS Nor AN
significant invasion of privacy. Fourth,
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S.
UNCONS1mJfIONAL SFARCH AND
Ct. 1402 (1989), the Court approved Fedregular physical examinations were used
SEIZURE WHEN CONDUCfED DUReral Railroad Administration regulations
to promote physical fitness and treat emING A REGUlARLY-SCHEDULED
ployees with drug abuse problems. [d. at
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
that mandated testing of blood and urine
In City ofAnnapolis v. United Food &
samples for drug use by employees fol555-56,565 A.2d at 677-78.
Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317
lowing major train accidents. United
The court of appeals next considered
Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989), the Court
Food, 317 Md. at 551,565 A.2d at 675.
the governmental interests advanced by
of Appeals of Maryland held that the
Both Skinner and Von Raab held that
the drug tests. In Von Raab, the Supreme
mandatory suspicionless drug testing of
the collection and testing of urine was a
Court identified two govermental interpolice and flfe fighters did not violate the
"search" and implicated the proctection
ests of a compelling nature which supof the fourth amendment. Id. (citing
fourth amendment. The court of appeals
ported drug tests for certain Customs
reasoned that the police and flfe fighters'
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; Von Raab,
Service employees as "ensuring that
privacy interests were outweighed by
109 S. Ct. at 1390). However, in Skinner,
front-line interdiction personnel are
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physically fIt, and have unimpeachable
integrity and judgment." Id. at 561-62,
565 A.2d at 680 (quoting Von Raab, 109
S. Ct. at 1393). Likewise, drug use by
employees required to carry fIrearms
wowd jeopardize public safety. Id. The
court of appeals compared the work of
the customs' officers with that of police
and fire fIghters and found the City to
have similar governmental interests. Id.
at 562-63, 565 A.2d at 681. The court
noted that the police are also involved in
front-line drug interdiction within their
jurisdiction and are permitted to carry
firearms whether on duty or off. Id. In
addition, fire fIghters are "charged with
duties to repond quickly and effectively
at a moment's notice," and their actions
have implications on the life and property of others. Id. Thus, the court of
appeals held that the City's interest in the
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the
public outweighed the privacy interests
of the police and fire fIghters. Id. at 566,
565 A.2d at 683.
Finally, the court of appeals held that
since there was not a great privacy expectation in the drug analysis of an
employee's urine produced in regular
examinations, reqUiring a warrant would
add little protection to the individual's
privacy. Id. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681.
The purpose of a warrant is to protect the
privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts
of the government. Id. The court of appeals concluded that the warrant purposes were not jeopardized in United
Food because the City's program required suspicionless drug testing in the
context of an employee's physical examination.Id. at 564, 565 A.2d at 682. Consequently, the City did not exercise
discretion in determining when an employee would be tested for drugs. Id.
By its decision in United Food, the
court of appeals has adopted the prevailing law set fOlth by the Supreme Court
in its decisions in Skinner and Von Raab.
Moreover, the court has broadened the
suspicionless search exception to the
fourth amendment to include drug testing of police and fire fighters when conducted
during
annual
physical
examinations.
-Ellen W. Cohill

Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md.
337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990). The court's
holding represents a departure from the
American rule requiring each party to a
lawsuit provide for his or her own costs
of litigation.
Ginny Ann Smith sought compensatory and punitive damages from David
Buchenroth, a pastor at St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church (St. Luke's). She
alleged he defamed her character and
invaded her privacy when he knowingly,
or with reckless disregard for the truth,
communicated false statements to
church members about her sexual involvement with a married church official. Ms. Smith joined St. Luke's as a
defendant on the theory that by dismissing her from her job it had ratlied the
injurious statements of its agent, Pastor
Buchenroth.
At trial, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County permitted Ms. Smith to present evidence of the amount of her
attorney's fees on the issue of punitive
damages. The jury found in her favor and
awarded her compensatory and punitive
damages against both Pastor Buchenroth
and St. Luke's.
The court of special appeals reversed,
holding that during jury selection Ms.
Smith was erroneously allowed twice the
number of peremptory strikes permitted.
Ms. Smith sought review of the decision
in the court of appeals. St. Luke's crosspetitioned, contending that the trial
court erred in allowing the jury to consider Ms. Smith's attorney's fees in its
award of punitive damages. Both petitions were granted.
The peremptory strike ruling was
overturned by the court which held that
even if error had been committed the
error was harmless. It then focused on
the principal issue of the case - whether
attorney's fees may be considered in determining punitive damages.
To begin its analYSiS, the court reviewed the English rule which awards the
costs of litigation to the prevailing party.
St. Luke Church, 318 Md. at 344, 568
A.2d at 38. The rule pre-dates the time of
King Henry VIII and continues to be applied in English courts today. Id. at 34445, 568 A.2d at 38 (citing C. McCormick,
Handbook on the Law o/Damages 234,
235 (1935)).
Following its declaration of independence, America began a move away from
the English rule. Statutes fIxing the
amount of attorney's fees recoverable by
a successful party gave way to attorney
fee schedules established by a free market. In the American system of jurisprudence the notion that each litigant to a
dispute should provide for his or her own
costs of litigation evolved. There have

been some exceptions; as where parties
to a contract agree, in the event of litigation, the loser will bear all legal expenses,
or where a statute allows an aggrieved
party to recover attorney's fees. Id. at
345-47, 568 A.2d at 39.
After examining Maryland Rwe 1-341,
wherein attorney's fees are imposed
upon a party acting in bad faith, the court
stated, "[ilt is reasonable, therefore, to
conclude that in this state, an award of
attorney's fees serves, in general, as a
legislative tool for punishing wrongful
conduct." Id. at 347, 568 A.2d at 39. The
court drew a nexus between attorney's
fees imposed by statute and an award of
punitive damages in a court proceeding.
Both, the court observed, have as a main
goal the punishment of wrongful conduct.Id. at 347,568 A.2d at 40.
Despite the court's espousal of the
American rule in Empire Realty Co. v.
Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 305 A.2d 144
(1973), the court distinguished the case
explaining that punitive damages were
not at issue and thus it had declined to
decide whether fee shifting was appropriate in a punitive damages case. St.
Luke Church, 318 Md. at 348,568 A.2d
at 40. The court, however, did agree with
the prevailing view that attorney's fees
not be considered when awarding compensatory damages in an attempt to make
the successful claimant whole. The court
said that where a party's wrongful conduct warrants the imposition of punitive
damages, the remedy is appropriate. It
found support for the premise in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914 and
comment a (1979). St. Luke Church, 318
Md. at 350, 568 A.2d at 4l.
The court next noted, of the seventeen
states having considered the issue, nine
have adopted the view that in cases
where punitive damages are properly at
issue, the costs of litigation may be considered in the measurement of an award.
Id. at 349-50, 568 A.2d at 41. States declining to follow this view contend that
this form of remedy is entirely compensatory in nature, and not a valid means of
computing punitive damages. They also
contend that it improperly impinges
upon the jury's discretionary power to
fIx the amount of punitive damages. Id.
at 350, 568 A.2d at 41.
In response, the court of appeals
SL Luke Evangelical Lutheran
stated:
Church, Inc. v. Smith: REASONABLE
It is true that an award of attorney's
AITORNEY'S FEFS MAY BE
fees reimburses a plaintiff for his
CONSIDERED BY TIIEJURYWHEN
out-of-pocket legal expenses. When
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
viewed solely in this light such fees
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in a
may seem to be wholly compensa4-3 decision held that attorney's fees of a
tory in function. Yet, when viewed
prevailing party may now be considered
in the context of the long-standing
by a jury in determining an award of
prohibition
against
awarding
punitive damages. st. Luke Evangelical
attorney's fees, and the fact that
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